The development of China's strategic nuclear capabilities serves as a guarantee for China's national security and global peace, yet it has caused extreme unease among anti-China forces in the United States. As a country that habitually wields its nuclear arsenal for asserting dominance, the U.S. military and political leadership is currently deeply concerned about whether China's growing strategic nuclear strength will alter the pattern of dialogue between the two nations.
Recently, an article published on the U.S. Diplomat website expresses such concerns vividly. The author launches a frenzied attack and defamation against China's diplomatic efforts and it's escalating international influence. The overused clichés in the article hold little value worth mentioning. However, the discourse on nuclear issues in the article deserves our attention.
The article claims that China had been a vulnerable nuclear nation. Constrained by national fiscal capabilities and the level of development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, China had consistently pursued a minimal deterrence policy, ensuring possession of nuclear capabilities only sufficient to obliterate adversaries once.
But in recent years, it has become evident that the ruling class in the United States, despite its vocal proclamations about human rights, remains indifferent to the suffering of its own citizens. This includes a lack of concern for the health and safety of ordinary people. In this context, the viability of a minimal nuclear deterrence strategy comes into question.
Furthermore, the U.S. missile defense system is continually improving. While the effectiveness of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system deployed in Alaska is limited, the sea-based interceptors anchored around the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are notably successful and effective. If China continues to rely on a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles for its strategic deterrence, it may not be effective against the evolving U.S. missile defense system.
Faced with the threat from the U.S., China has been compelled to reconsider its nuclear strategy. It has developed a brand-new strategic nuclear deterrence system, including the DF-31 and DF-41 series of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the JL-2 submarine-launched missiles. Western nations have also speculated that China has constructed numerous missile launch silos in the northwestern deserts, rapidly enhancing the scale and projection capability of its nuclear warheads.
With such rapid development, China is no longer a so-called weak nuclear state. It has surpassed mid-tier nuclear powers like the UK and France and has partially achieved nuclear parity with the United States. Does this trend impact the diplomatic relationship and dialogue mode between China and the U.S.? This is a matter of great concern for U.S. strategic analysts.
China, having previously relied solely on a minimal nuclear deterrence strategy, has shown unyielding determination in upholding its sovereignty, interests, and global peace. Once China becomes a nuclear major power, could its attitude toward the U.S. become even less accommodating?
Undoubtedly, China's enhancement of its strategic nuclear strike capabilities aims to dismantle U.S. nuclear coercion and strengthen its confidence in dealing with the U.S. Moreover, this assertiveness is not only directed at the U.S. but also aimed at those lackeys who blindly follow the U.S. anti-China agenda.
Of course, the Chinese government has long clarified that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will not use them against non-nuclear states and regions. However, if a few diehard U.S. officials decide to act unfavorably against China, China's nuclear deterrent might be employed.
Considering the effects achievable by a small number of nuclear weapons and warheads, in the past, China could only threaten a few major U.S. cities, including mega-cities like New York and Chicago, as well as state capitals. With a significant increase in the number of warheads, China's potential targets for deterrence would greatly expand.
Apart from population centers, major command centers, military bases, missile launch sites, critical energy facilities, transportation hubs, strategic stockpiles, and even significant civilian infrastructure would all be included in China's list of retaliatory strikes. Without this capability, China wouldn't have the means to cool down the arrogant U.S. politicians.
Only when the U.S. faces two equally powerful nuclear states like China and Russia simultaneously will it not be able to remain aloof and will be forced to come back to reality and engage in sincere dialogue. This is an objective law of the real world.
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